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ABSTRACT: After describing the measures adopted by the European Central Bank (ECB) to mitigate 
the crisis caused by the COVID-19 pandemic in the euro area, the Insight focusses on the repercus-
sions of the controversial judgment adopted by the German Federal Constitutional Court (BVerfG) 
on 5 May 2020. It is contended that the criteria adopted by the BVerfG to assess the consistency of 
the Public Sector Purchase Programme with the monetary financing prohibition might lead to a 
future finding that the PEPP programme indeed circumvents the prohibition. While the BVerfG 
judgment is putting sand in the wheels of the ECB and is exposing the limits of the current legal 
framework, it might also prompt a leap forward in the European integration process. 
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I. Introduction 
On 12 March 2020, the day after the WHO Director-General finally defined the outbreak 
of COVID-19 a pandemic,1 the European Central Bank (ECB) Governing Council adopted 
a comprehensive package of monetary policy measures consisting of: a) additional 
longer-term refinancing operations aimed at providing immediate liquidity support to 
the euro area financial system, b) negative interest rates for Targeted Longer-Term Re-
financing Operations to stimulate bank lending to households and small and medium 
 
* Associate Professor of International Law, University of Torino; Law Affiliate, Collegio Carlo Alberto 
(Torino), anna.viterbo@unito.it. 
1 See WHO Director-General’s opening remarks at the media briefing on COVID-19, 11 March 2020, 
www.who.int. 
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enterprises, and c) an additional temporary €120 billion financial envelope to broaden 
private asset purchases.2 
Quite unexpectedly though, during the press conference following the announce-
ment of these measures, the ECB President Christine Lagarde affirmed that it was not 
the ECB’s role to narrow the spread in sovereign debt markets: “this is not the function or 
the mission of the ECB. There are other tools for that, and there are other actors to actually 
deal with those issues [read: the European Stability Mechanism]”.3 
The statement left everyone bewildered and comparisons were immediately made 
with the famous “whatever it takes” pronounced by the former President of the ECB Mar-
io Draghi in 2012, at the peak of the European sovereign debt crisis.4 
Market reaction came without delay, causing Italian sovereign bonds to suffer the big-
gest single day fall in almost a decade, amid widespread euro area debt market sell-offs.5 
The fear was that the ECB would retreat from its role of buyer of sovereign bonds at 
a time when public debt levels were forecast to rise steadily, with spreads already wid-
ening (in particular, between Italian and German sovereign bond yields) and financial 
fragmentation (certainly detrimental to a currency union) spiking. 
ECB official declarations to reassure the markets quickly followed, signalling how 
dire the situation already was and making everyone suddenly aware of the tangible 
threats that were looming once again over the euro area.6  
Less than a week later, on 18 March 2020, the ECB decided to launch the new Pan-
demic Emergency Purchase Programme (PEPP)7 covering both private and public sector 
 
2 See ECB Press Release of 12 March 2020, Monetary policy decisions, www.ecb.europa.eu. The pack-
age of measures was welcomed by the Eurogroup on 16 March 2020, see Eurogroup, Statement on COVID-
19 economic policy response, www.consilium.europa.eu.  
3 The ECB President also affirmed “I do not have a claim to history for being whatever-it-takes number 
two”. Press conference of Christine Lagarde, President of the ECB, of 12 March 2020, www.ecb.europa.eu. 
Among other reactions to Lagarde’s press conference, see M. ARNOLD, T. STUBBINGTON, Lagarde Triggers Inves-
tor Jitters as ECB Launches Virus Response, in Financial Times, 13 March 2020. 
4 The full quotation is “Within our mandate, the ECB is ready to do whatever it takes to preserve the euro. 
And believe me, it will be enough” (speech of 26 July 2012by M. DRAGHI, President of the European Central 
Bank, at the Global Investment Conference in London , www.ecb.europa.eu).  
5 Source: M. ARNOLD, M. KHAN, Five Ways the ECB Can Bolster the Eurozone’s Pandemic Firepower, in Fi-
nancial Times, 30 April 2020. 
6 See for instance P.R. Lane, Member of the Executive Board of the ECB: “We will not tolerate any 
risks to the smooth transmission of our monetary policy in all jurisdictions of the euro area. We clearly 
stand ready to do more and adjust all of our instruments, if needed to ensure that the elevated spreads 
that we see in response to the acceleration of the spreading of the coronavirus do not undermine trans-
mission” (P.R. LANE, The Monetary Policy Package: An Analytical Framework, in ECB Blog, 13 March 2020, 
www.ecb.europa.eu. In addition, see the Eurogroup, Statement on COVID-19 Economic Policy Response 
of 16 March 2020, www.consilium.europa.eu. 
7 Decision (EU) 2020/440 of the European Central Bank of 24 March 2020 on a temporary pandemic 
emergency purchase programme (ECB/2020/17) (hereinafter “PEPP Decision”). 
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securities. In particular, the PEPP is aimed at ensuring that euro area Member States 
will enjoy low funding costs during the economic disruption triggered by the pandemic. 
The PEPP decision was complemented by a package of collateral easing measures.8 
On 7 April 2020, anticipating a spate of downgrades of credit ratings (sovereign ratings 
included), the ECB decided to relax the eligibility requirements for marketable assets 
used as collateral in Eurosystem credit operations as well as for their issuers.9 In paral-
lel, the Governing Council of the ECB decided to waive the minimum rating requirement 
for Greek government bonds.10 
On 22 April 2020, the ECB adopted an additional “grandfathering” decision by which 
all assets and issuers11 that, at 7 April 2020 met collateral eligibility requirements, will 
remain eligible until September 2021, even in the face of a deterioration in credit rat-
ings, provided that they remain above a minimum credit quality threshold (i.e. Credit 
Quality Step 5 on the Eurosystem harmonised rating scale).12 
A few days later, Fitch downgraded Italy’s sovereign rating from BBB to BBB- (with 
stable outlook), just above non-investment grade and Credit Quality Step 4. 
Notably, the grandfathering decision was not extended to eligibility criteria for outright 
purchases under the asset purchase (APP) and PEPP programmes.13 However, the ECB 
 
8 According to Art. 18.1 of the ESCB Statute, the ECB and euro area national central banks (NCBs) can op-
erate in financial markets and provide credit to counterparties only against “adequate collateral”. The assump-
tion is that central banks should only lend against high quality collateral. Collateral requirements are con-
ceived to mitigate credit risk, ensure equal treatment of counterparties and enhance operational efficiency 
and transparency. Criteria to determine assets adequacy, as well as entities that may act as counterparties in 
credit operations, are established by two sets of provisions: the ECB General and Temporary Frameworks. The 
emergency collateral package consists in a set of temporary measures that, as part of the Temporary frame-
work, complement, amend or overrule the General Framework. The Temporary Framework in fact allows the 
ECB to adopt derogatory measures that may become necessary under exceptional circumstances. 
9 Decision (EU) 2020/506 of the European Central Bank of 7 April 2020 amending Guideline (EU) 
2015/510 on the implementation of the Eurosystem monetary policy framework and Guideline (EU) 2016/65 
on the valuation haircuts applied in the implementation of the Eurosystem monetary policy framework. 
10 See ECB announces package of temporary collateral easing measures, in ECB Press Release of 7 
April 2020 and Guideline (EU) 2020/515 of the ECB of 7 April 2020 amending Guideline ECB/2014/31 on 
additional temporary measures relating to Eurosystem refinancing operations and eligibility of collateral 
(ECB/2020/21). 
11 Other than asset-backed securities. 
12 See ECB takes steps to mitigate impact of possible rating downgrades on collateral availability, in 
ECB Press Release of 22 April 2020 and Guideline (EU) 2020/634 of the ECB of 7 May 2020 amending 
Guideline ECB/2014/31 on additional temporary measures relating to Eurosystem refinancing operations 
and eligibility of collateral (ECB/2020/29). 
13 See recital no. 4, Guideline (EU) 2020/634, cit. 
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hinted that it was ready to go further following the example of the US Federal Reserve, 
which had already included “fallen angels”14 in its corporate bond purchase programme. 
Therefore, after initial hesitation, the ECB showed that it was willing to act resolute-
ly, while the Eurogroup and the European Council were struggling to progress on crucial 
and highly sensitive issues like the increase of EU own resources, the issuance of com-
mon European bonds, the reform of the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) and the 
establishment of a European Recovery Fund.15 
Soon after, though, the German Federal Constitutional Court (Bundesverfas-
sungsgericht, hereinafter “BVerfG”) would pour gasoline on the pandemic fire.  
As we will see, the decision of the Second Senate of the BVerfG – expected for 16 
March 2020 but craftily postponed to 5 May 202016 – has thrown sand in the wheels of 
the ECB and might have serious repercussions on the resilience of the euro area. 
After describing the main features of the PEPP, this research will focus on the im-
pact of the BVerfG’s ruling on the ability of the ECB to act in times of crisis. 
II. The Pandemic Emergency Purchase Programme (PEPP) 
The Pandemic Emergency Purchase Programme (PEPP) is a non-standard monetary policy 
measure in line with the other non-standard measures adopted by the ECB between 2010 
and 2014: the Securities Markets Programme (SMP),17 the Outright Monetary Transac-
tions programme (OMT)18 and the package of Asset Purchase Programmes (APP).19 
 
14 Is defined “fallen angel” a bond – corporate or sovereign – that has been downgraded from in-
vestment grade to a high yield credit rating (junk bond status). This may result from the economic slow-
down caused by the pandemic.  
15 See the Letter of Eurogroup President Mario Centeno to the President of the European Council fol-
lowing the Eurogroup of 24 March 2020, www.consilium.europa.eu. 
16 German Federal Constitutional Court, judgment of the Second Senate of 5 May 2020, 2 BvR 
859/15, 2 BvR 1651/15, 2 BvR 2006/15, 2 BvR 980/16 (hereinafter PSPP judgment). 
17 The ECB’s Decision that established the SMP was adopted in May 2010, to counter the severe ten-
sion in the securities markets of certain euro area countries caused by the outburst of the Greek debt 
crisis and restore an appropriate monetary policy transmission (Decision of 14 May 2010 of the ECB es-
tablishing a securities markets programme (ECB/2010/5) (hereinafter SMP Decision)). A first group of sec-
ondary market purchases were made between 10 May 2010 – 25 March 2011 for debt securities issued 
by Greece, Ireland and Portugal and a second one, between 4 August 2011 – February 2012, for debt se-
curities issued by Ireland and Portugal as well as by Italy and Spain. The SMP programme ended on 6 
September 2012, when the OMT was announced. 
18 The OMT programme was intended to safeguard an appropriate monetary policy transmission 
and the singleness of the monetary policy at a time when disturbances affected specific countries. The 
OMT was therefore a selective instrument, designed to target individual member States. No official ECB 
decision on the OMT programme was ever adopted. The technical features of the OMT are described in 
Technical Features of Outright Monetary Transactions, in ECB Press Release of 6 September 2012, 
www.ecb.europa.eu. See also: ECB Monthly Bulletin, September 2012, pp. 7-11 and ECB Monthly Bulletin, 
October 2012, pp. 7-9.  
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The APP, which is the only one currently active, includes the Public Sector Purchase 
Programme (PSPP) for the purchase of bonds issued by euro area member States, rec-
ognised agencies, international organisations and supranational institutions located in 
the eurozone.20 
The PEPP is a separate and additional temporary tool21 which blends some of the 
features of previous programmes.22 
The decision to introduce the PEPP was prompted not only by the concrete risk of 
disruption of the monetary transmission mechanism across the whole euro area but 
also by the downside risks to price stability caused by the COVID-19 exogenous shock.23  
Initially, the volume of the PEPP was set at €750 billion. On 4 June 2020, however, 
the ECB’s Governing Council decided to increase it by €600 billion. The current PEPP en-
velope of €1350 billion is considerably large. Suffice it will be to compare it to the total 
value of securities purchased under the APP until April 2020 (€2.7 trillion, of which al-
most €2.2 trillion under the PSPP), to the 2019 EU budget (€165.8 billion) and to the first 
financial assistance package for Greece (€110 billion).24 
The PEPP financial envelope will be used to purchase all the asset categories al-
ready eligible under the APP (i.e. both private and public sector securities). In addition, 
 
19 The Asset Purchase Programme (APP) consists of four parts: the Corporate Sector Purchase Pro-
gramme (CSPP), the Public Sector Purchase Programme (PSPP), the Asset-Backed Securities Purchase 
Programme (ABSPP) and the Third Covered Bond Purchase Programme (CBPP3). 
20 Decision (EU) 2015/774 of the ECB of 4 March 2015 on a secondary markets public sector asset 
purchase programme (ECB/2015/10), as lastly amended by Decision (EU) 2020/188 of the ECB of 3 Febru-
ary 2020 on a secondary markets public sector asset purchase programme (ECB/2020/9) (hereinafter 
PSPP Decision). The Eurosystem conducted net purchases of public sector securities under the PSPP be-
tween 9 March 2015 and 19 December 2018. Since January 2019 principal repayments received at maturi-
ty on securities held in the PSPP portfolio are being reinvested to buy new government bonds. On 1 No-
vember 2019, the Eurosystem restarted net purchases under the PSPP (see the Decision of the ECB Gov-
erning Council adopted on 12 September 2019). 
21 Purchases under the PEPP will terminate at the end of June 2021 or as soon as the crisis will be 
over. Principal payments on maturing securities purchased under the PEPP will be reinvested until at 
least the end of 2022. 
22 For a legal analysis of the PEPP before the BVerfG ruling, see among others A. BOBIC, M. DAWSON, 
COVID-19 and the European Central Bank: The Legal Foundations of EMU as the Next Victim?, in Verfas-
sungsblog, 27 March 2020, verfassungsblog.de; M. GOLDMANN, Borrowing Time, in Verfassungsblog, 27 
March 2020, verfassungsblog.de; S. GRUND, Legal, Compliant and Suitable: The ECB’s Pandemic Emergency 
Purchase Programme (PEPP), in Hertie School and Jacques Delors Centre Policy Brief, 25 March 2020, 
www.delorscentre.eu; R. SMITS, Op-Ed: The European Central Bank’s Pandemic Bazooka: Mandate Fulfilment 
in Extraordinary Times, in EULawLive, 23 March 2020, eulawlive.com; M. VAN DER SLUIS, Analysis: Fighting the 
Fallout: the ECB Adopts a Purchase Programme in Response to the Coronavirus, in EULawLive, 24 March 2020, 
eulawlive.com. 
23 Recital no. 4 of the Preamble of the PEPP Decision, cit. 
24 Data are available at www.ecb.europa.eu. 
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the PEPP also covers instruments issued by non-financial companies25 and debt securi-
ties with a remaining maturity of at least 70 days.26 
The eligibility requirements for marketable debt securities under the PEPP are the 
same established by the PSPP Decision (as amended in 2020).27 Therefore, the mini-
mum rating requirement for issuers of debt securities is set at Credit Quality Step 3 (i.e. 
Fitch: BBB-, Moody’s: Baa3, Standard & Poor’s: BBB-).  
Moreover, by referring to the PSPP Decision, the PEPP follows the same conditional-
ity policy, in practice importing that attached to ESM financial assistance.28 In fact, 
should an ESM programme country no longer comply with Credit Quality Step 3, its debt 
securities would remain nonetheless eligible, provided that a waiver is granted by the 
ECB Governing Council after assessing compliance of the country concerned with finan-
cial assistance conditionality.29 
It is worth noting that the PEPP Decision contains a special waiver for Greek debt 
securities.30 The waiver was granted not only because Greece had regained market ac-
cess but also considering the commitments undertaken by the country in the context of 
the enhanced surveillance framework after successfully completing the ESM pro-
gramme in August 2018. 
It should be underlined, though, that both the PSPP and the PEPP might be ex-
panded to include sovereign fallen angels, either by granting ad hoc waivers (as already 
done with Greece) or by amending the eligibility criteria. Similar decisions are likely to 
stir controversy, not much from a monetary policy point of view but for their implica-
 
25 In particular, the eligibility requirements for CSPP were broadened to include short-term instru-
ments issued by non-financial corporations.  
26 Under the PSPP, the remaining maturity of debt securities is set at a minimum of one year. 
27 In particular, the PEPP Decision contains a reference to the PSPP Decision which, in turn, refers 
back to the General Framework and in particular to Part Four of Guideline (EU) 2015/510 of the ECB as 
lastly amended, cit. 
28 According to Art. 3, para. 2, let. d), of the PSPP Decision, “In the event of a review of an ongoing finan-
cial assistance programme, eligibility for PSPP purchases shall be suspended and shall resume only in the event 
of a positive outcome of the review”. “Positive outcome of the review” means ”the later of the following two 
decisions: the decision by the Board of Directors of the European Stability Mechanism and, in case the 
International Monetary Fund co-finances the financial assistance programme, the Executive Board of the 
International Monetary Fund to approve the next disbursement under that programme, on the under-
standing that both decisions are necessary for the resumption of purchases under the PSPP” (Art. 2, no. 
5, of the PSPP Decision). 
29 See Art. 3, para. 2, let. d), of the PSPP Decision, cit. and Art. 8 of the Guideline of the European 
Central Bank of 9 July 2014 on additional temporary measures relating to Eurosystem refinancing opera-
tions and eligibility of collateral and amending Guideline ECB/2007/9. Notably, pursuant to Art. 16 of the 
ESM Treaty, the ESM Board of Directors (which mirrors the composition of the Eurogroup) will be called to 
decide on the disbursement of the different tranches of financial assistance after the European Commis-
sion monitored compliance with the programme conditionality. In practice, this provides political cover-
age to any ECB waiver decision. 
30 Art. 3 of the PEPP Decision, cit. 
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tions on purchase programmes as these would risk be considered tools that circumvent 
the monetary financing prohibition set by Art. 123 TFEU.31 
Notably, some important safeguards that were included in the PSPP to mitigate fi-
nancial risks are absent in the PEPP. 
First of all, there are no purchase limits to avoid that the Eurosystem becomes a 
predominant creditor of certain euro area countries, as the PEPP does not have the is-
sue and issuer limits contained in the PSPP.32 
Second, the PEPP is significantly more flexible than earlier programmes even for 
what concerns the allocation of purchases among euro area Member States. In fact, 
even though PEPP purchases of debt securities are proportionally allocated among 
member States on the basis of their share in the ECB’s capital (the so-called “capital 
key”),33 the PEPP allows “fluctuations in the distribution of purchase flows over time, 
across asset classes and among jurisdictions”.34 In practice, the ECB is allowed to focus, 
at least temporarily, on buying government bonds issued by certain States. Admittedly 
though, since the Eurosystem will not target specific member States for the entire dura-
tion of the programme, the PEPP cannot be considered a selective instrument.35 
On the other hand, similarly to the PSPP, only 20 per cent of public sector asset 
purchases will be subject to risk sharing. 
Even if data on PEPP purchases at country level are not published by the ECB, we 
can presume that the flexibility embedded in the programme not only has already been 
applied but that it was also extended to the PSPP. 
In fact, in March, April and May 2020, Eurosystem’s purchases under the PSPP devi-
ated significantly from the capital key (in particular, purchases of Italian bonds were 
above the capital key and those of German bonds below the capital key).36 
 
31 See also Art. 21, para. 1, of the ESCB Statute. 
32 The issue limit refers to the maximum share of a single PSPP-eligible security that the Eurosystem 
may hold. The issuer limit refers to the maximum share of an issuer’s outstanding securities that the Eu-
rosystem may buy. The Eurosystem can buy only up to 33 per cent of a country’s outstanding securities (is-
suer limit) and up to 33 per cent of any particular bond series as identified by its ISIN number (issue limit). 
33 Pursuant to Art. 29 of the Protocol on the ESCB and of the ECB, the share of each national central 
bank (NCB) in the ECB’s capital is calculated on the basis of the share of each member State in the total 
population and gross domestic product of the EU, with each factor having equal weighting. Percentage 
shares are recalculated every five years and whenever there is a change in the number of NCBs contrib-
uting to the ECB’s capital. The most recent changes to the capital keys entered into force on 1 January 
2019. For instance, among other adjustments, the contribution of the Bank of Italy to the ECB capital was 
reduced from 12.31 per cent to 11.8 per cent. As a result, the ECB had to readjust its holdings in the PSPP 
portfolio to bring them in alignment with the new capital key.  
34 Art. 5 of the PEPP Decision and recital no. 5 of its preamble. 
35 Cfr. Court of Justice, judgment of 16 June 2015, case C-62/14, Gauweiler and Others v. ECB [GC], pa-
ras 89-90. 
36 Data on PSPP monthly net purchases at country level are regularly published by the ECB and are 
available at www.ecb.europa.eu. The ECB will not publish information on PEPP purchases at country level. 
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It is here maintained that the PEPP is an appropriate tool to respond to the new eco-
nomic circumstances, as demonstrated by the fact that, since the day of its announce-
ment, spreads have fallen and a deflationary spiral has been avoided. Unfortunately, 
however, some of the features of the programme seem at odds with the interpretation of 
the monetary financing prohibition given by the BVerfG in its recent judgment.  
After describing where the interpretation of Art. 123 TFEU given by the CJEU and the 
BVerfG differs, the possible implications will be analysed in the next section. 
III. A message from Karlsruhe: is the PEPP on the verge of monetary 
financing? 
Compliance of the SMP, the OMT and the PSPP with Arts 119, 123, 127 TFEU and Arts 17 
to 24 of ESCB Protocol37 has been systematically challenged before the Court of Justice 
of the European Union (CJEU), leading to the very first judgments on the matter. 
As regards the SMP, in Accorinti, the General Court found that the programme fell 
within the ECB’s monetary policy mandate, a mandate that, due to the complex and 
technical evaluations involved, the ECB can exercise with “broad discretion”.38 
In Gauweiler39 and Weiss,40 the Court of Justice also found that the OMT and PSPP 
programmes did not contravene the principle of conferral or the prohibition of mone-
tary financing. Notably, in both cases the referral came from the BVerfG, which had un-
til then never submitted to the Court of Justice a request for a preliminary ruling. 
It is at this point of the “dialogue” between the BVerfG and the Court of Justice that 
the communication was interrupted (more accurately, the BVerfG put the phone down). 
On 5 May 2020, the Second Senate of the BVerfG delivered its judgment on the con-
stitutional complaints concerning the PSPP from which the Weiss decision of the Court 
of Justice originated. The BVerfG affirmed that the judgment of the Court of Justice was 
rendered ultra vires: in its assessment of the PSPP proportionality, the Court of Justice 
had entirely disregarded the actual economic policy effects of the programme nor did it 
undertake a “comprehensible review”41 as to whether the ECB had observed the limits 
 
37 Protocol no. 4 on the Statute of the ESCB Statute, cit. 
38 General Court, judgment of 7 October 2015, case T-79/13, Alessandro Accorinti and Others v. ECB, para. 
68. The case did not directly concern the validity of the programme, but the fact that the ECB’s holdings of 
Greek sovereign bonds were excluded from the 2012 debt restructuring. During the Greek sovereign debt 
restructuring, the ECB was shielded from bearing any losses on the Greek bonds it had purchased through 
the SMP programme: in mid-February 2012, shortly before Greece launched its exchange offer, the ECB 
swapped the Greek bonds it had purchased for “new” bonds with identical nominal value, payment terms 
and maturity dates, but different serial numbers, so that they could be kept outside the remit of the Greek 
Bondholder Act and therefore were not involved in the application of retroactive collective action clauses. 
39 Gauweiler [GC], cit. 
40 Court of Justice, judgment of 11 December 2018, case C-493/17, Heinrich Weiss and Others v. ECB 
[GC] (hereinafter Weiss). 
41 BVerfG, PSPP judgment, cit., para. 123. 
The PSPP Judgment of the German Federal Constitutional Court 9 
of its mandate. Since ultra vires acts do not have binding effect and are not applicable in 
Germany, the BVerfG held that it was entitled to conduct its own review of the validity 
of the PSPP programme. 
As a result of its own review, the BVerfG concluded that, by unconditionally pursu-
ing the PSPP monetary policy objective without considering its economic policy effects, 
the ECB manifestly disregarded the principle of proportionality; in the PSPP decision, 
the ECB failed to balance the monetary policy objective with the economic policy effects 
stemming from the programme.42 Therefore, the interpretation of the proportionality 
principle carried out by the Court of Justice, and the resulting delimitation of the ESCB’s 
competence, exceeded its judicial mandate. 
As a consequence, the BVerfG has required the Federal Government and the Bun-
destag to ensure that the ECB will conduct a proportionality assessment of the PSPP.43 
In addition, unless “the ECB Governing Council adopts a new decision that demon-
strates in a comprehensible and substantiated manner”44 the proportionality of the 
PSPP within 3 months from the judgment, the Bundesbank would no longer be allowed 
to take part in the implementation and execution of the PSPP. 
It is not the purpose of this paper to review the above-mentioned CJEU decisions, 
nor to provide an in-depth analysis of the BVerfG ruling on the PSPP. The latter has 
been rightly received with fierce criticism by legal scholars45 and EU institutions alike.46 
 
42 Ibid., para. 119. 
43 Ibid., paras 229-233. 
44 Ibid., paras 234-235. 
45 See, among others, S. CAFARO, Quale Quantitative Easing e quale Unione Europea dopo la Sentenza del 
5 maggio?, in SIDIBlog, 8 May 2020, www.sidiblog.org; G. CLAEYS, The ECB in the COVID-19 Crisis: Whatever It 
Takes, Within Its Mandate, in The ECB’s Mandate: Perspectives on General Economic Policies: Compilation of 
Papers, Study requested by the ECON Committee of the European Parliament for the Monetary Dialogue, June 
2020, p. 115 et seq., www.europarl.europa.eu; G. DAVIES, The German Constitutional Court Decides Price Sta-
bility May not Be Worth Its Price, in European Law Blog, 21 May 2020, europeanlawblog.eu; R.M. LASTRA, K. 
ALEXANDER, The ECB Mandate: Perspectives on Sustainability and Solidarity, in The ECB’s Mandate: Perspectives 
on General Economic Policies, Compilation of Papers, study requested by the ECON Committee of the Eu-
ropean Parliament for the Monetary Dialogue, June 2020, p. 5 et seq., www.europarl.europa.eu; F. 
MARTUCCI, La BCE et la Cour constitutionnelle allemande: souligner les paradoxes de l’arrêt du 5 mai de la Cour 
constitutionnelle allemande, in Le club des juristes, 11 May 2020, www.leclubdesjuristes.com; M. POIARES 
MADURO, Some Preliminary Remarks on the PSPP Decision of the German Constitutional Court, in Verfas-
sungsblog, 6 May 2020, verfassungsblog.de; D. URANIA-GALETTA, Karlsruhe über alles? Il ragionamento sul 
principio di proporzionalità nella pronunzia del 5 maggio 2020 del BVerfG tedesco e le sue conseguenze, in 
Federalismi, 7 May 2020, www.federalismi.it; J. ZILLER, The Unbearable Heaviness of the German Constitution-
al Judge: on the Judgment of the Second Chamber of the German Federal Constitutional Court of 5 May 2020 
Concerning the European Central Bank’s PSPP Programme, in CERIDAP, 7 May 2020, ceridap.eu. 
46 See the unorthodox press release of the Court of Justice of the European Union following the 
judgment of the German Constitutional Court of 5 May 2020 (CJEU, Press Release no. 58/20 of 8 May 
2020, available at curia.europa.eu) as well as the ECB Press Release of 5 May 2020, ECB takes note of Ger-
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We certainly agree that the BVerfG’s judgment is a vulnus to the primacy of EU law 
and to the independence of the ECB47 and that it can jeopardise the unity of the EU le-
gal system.48 We intend though to focus on a relatively neglected aspect: the potential 
impact of the BVerfG ruling on the ability of the ECB to act in times of crisis.49 
Although the BVerfG explicitly affirmed that its judgment – postponed while await-
ing the PEPP – only applied to the PSPP,50 the way in which the German Court interpret-
ed the criteria to assess the consistency of the PSPP with the monetary financing prohi-
bition is problematic.  
It is true that the BVerfG reached the conclusion that the PSPP does not circumvent 
Art. 123 TFEU,51 but will it maintain this stance in future cases? The BVerfG decision 
seems in fact – and not even in a concealed way – to invite the filing of new constitu-
tional complaints against the PEPP. 
At this stage of the analysis, a comparison between the interpretation provided by 
the Court of Justice and the BVerfG of Art. 123 TFEU is necessary. 
From the combined reading of the Gauweiler and Weiss judgments we can infer the 
interpretative criteria that the Court of Justice will most probably use to assess whether 
the PEPP circumvents the monetary financing prohibition. 
First of all, the programme must not have an equivalent effect to that of a direct pur-
chase of bonds on primary markets.52 Secondly, the ECB has to put in place sufficient safe-
guards to ensure that the issuing country keeps pursuing a sound budgetary policy.53 
 
man Federal Constitutional Court ruling and remains fully committed to its mandate, available at 
www.ecb.europa.eu. 
47 Pursuant to Art. 130 TFEU, in the performance of the tasks conferred upon them by the Treaty and 
the ESCB Statute, the ECB and the NCBs are independent both from national instruction and from the 
instruction of other EU institutions. 
48 The European Commission has already announced that it is considering opening an infringement 
procedure against Germany (see Statement by President Von der Leyen of 10 May 2020, available at 
ec.europa.eu). For what concerns the eventuality of the Bundesbank not taking part in the PSPP, the ECB 
might resort to Art. 271, let. d), TFEU, pursuant to which the Court of Justice has jurisdiction in disputes 
concerning the fulfilment by national central banks of obligations under the Treaties and the Statute of 
the ESCB and of the ECB. In the context of this procedure, the Governing Council of the ECB will have the 
same powers conferred upon the Commission by Art. 258 TFEU. 
49 On the flawed legal and economic analysis of the BVerfG on the proportionality principle and on 
the distinction between monetary and economic policies, see K. WHELAN, The ECB’s Mandate and Legal Con-
straints, in The ECB’s Mandate: Perspectives on General Economic Policies, Compilation of Papers, study re-
quested by the ECON Committee of the European Parliament for the Monetary Dialogue, June 2020, p. 47 
et seq., www.europarl.europa.eu. See also M. POIARES MADURO, Some Preliminary Remarks, cit. 
50 See the Press Release no. 32/2020 of the German Constitutional Court of 5 May 2020, ECB Deci-
sions on the Public Sector Purchase Programme Exceed EU Competences, www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de.  
51 See BVerfG, PSPP judgment, cit., paras 213-217. 
52 Gauweiler [GC], cit., para. 97; Weiss [GC], cit., paras 109-128. 
53 Gauweiler [GC], cit., paras 100-102 and 109; Weiss [GC], cit., paras 129-132. 
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According to the Court of Justice, there will be no equivalent effect in the absence of 
foreseeability: in other words, private operators should not have the certainty that their 
bonds will be repurchased by the Eurosystem on secondary markets.54 This may be 
averted by adopting precautions such as black-out periods, the non-disclosure of volumes 
purchased from each Member State in a given month and the setting of purchase limits.55 
As for the built-in safeguards conceived to avoid the loss of impetus in pursuing a 
sound budgetary policy, the Court of Justice focusses on the following aspects: the tem-
porariness and volume of a programme;56 the possibility of selling bonds at any time;57 
the application of the capital key;58 purchase limits per issue and per issuer;59 the adop-
tion of strict eligibility criteria based on a credit quality assessment with exceptions 
solely for States that have entered a financial assistance programme.60 In the presence 
of these safeguards, a Member State abandoning a sound budgetary policy will not be 
able to rely on the financing possibilities of a purchase programme without risking that 
its sovereign bonds become ineligible or are sold by the Eurosystem. 
It has to be emphasised though that, according to the Court of Justice, these safe-
guards do not amount to necessary requirements and that they can either be relaxed 
or recombined. In fact, their weight in the Court’s assessment can change depending 
“both on the particular features of the programme under consideration and on the 
economic context in which that programme is adopted and implemented”.61 
The BVerfG met with “considerable concerns” the conclusions reached by the Court of 
Justice in the Weiss decision on the PSPP consistency with the monetary financing prohibi-
tion, as these did “not satisfy the requirements relating to effective judicial review”.62 The 
German Court conceded that the PSPP does not violate Art. 123 TFEU, but only when the 
safeguards – autonomously interpreted by the same BVerfG – are strictly observed.63 
In fact, the BVerfG provided its own interpretation to (the “proper application of”64) 
the criteria that it deemed crucial for the validity of the programme: the existence of a 
margin of uncertainty over the fact that newly issued government bonds would in any 
case be purchased by the Eurosystem; the adoption of purchase limits; a rigorous dis-
tribution of purchases according to the ECB’s capital key; the observance of a blackout 
period; the application of stringent eligibility requirements limiting purchases to bonds 
 
54 Gauweiler [GC], cit., para. 104; Weiss [GC], cit., para. 110. 
55 Gauweiler [GC], cit., paras 106-107; Weiss [GC], cit., paras 113-128. 
56 Gauweiler [GC], cit., para. 112; Weiss [GC], cit., paras 133-134. 
57 Weiss [GC], cit., para. 135. 
58 Ibid., para. 140. 
59 Ibid., para. 141. 
60 Gauweiler [GC], cit., paras 119-120; Weiss [GC], cit., para. 142. 
61 Weiss [GC], cit., para. 108. 
62 BVerfG, PSPP judgment, cit., paras 180 and 184. 
63 Ibid., para. 180. 
64 Ibid., para. 197. 
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issued by States satisfying a minimum credit rating; the holding until maturity only as 
an exception; and the existence of an exit strategy.65 
The first effect of the BVerfG ruling is certainly a stiffening of the interpretative cri-
teria adopted by the Court of Justice, which would reduce the ECB’s ability to achieve its 
primary objective of price stability and adopt crisis prevention measures. 
The second consequence concerns the future application of the BVerfG criteria to 
the PEPP, the most problematic of which are: a) purchase limits,66 b) the allocation of 
purchases on the basis of the capital key67 and c) the eligibility requirements.68 
a) There are no purchase limits in the PEPP,69 whereas the BVerfG affirmed that “only 
on this condition can it be assumed that the market is not dominated by the Eurosystem, 
which is imperative for preventing Member States and market operators from being 
largely certain that newly issued government bonds will be purchased by the ESCB”.70 
b) According to the BVerfG, reference to the capital key “constitutes an objective cri-
terion that is independent of the economic and budgetary situation of the respective 
member State of the euro area”.71 Therefore, for the BVerfG any departure from this 
criterion will be an unequivocal signal that bond purchases are intended to meet the 
specific financing needs of countries in distress. 
On the contrary, the PEPP expressly provides for a flexible – albeit temporary – ap-
plication of the capital key.72 For the ECB, this flexible approach – which by the way has 
already been applied and extended to the PSPP – is “essential to prevent current dislo-
cation in the aggregate euro area sovereign yield curve from being translated into fur-
ther distortions in the euro area risk-free yield curve”.73 
 
65 Ibid., paras 198-217. 
66 Ibid., paras 201-202. 
67 Ibid., paras 203-204. 
68 Ibid., paras 207-208. 
69 See recital no. 6 of the PEPP Decision, according to which “The Governing Council also decided that 
to the extent some self-imposed limits might hamper action that the Eurosystem is required to take in 
order to fulfil its mandate, the Governing Council will consider revising them to the extent necessary to 
make its action proportionate to the risks faced”. On the contrary, Art. 5 of the PSPP Decision establishes 
issue purchase limits as well as issuer purchase limits.  
70 BVerfG, PSPP judgment, cit., para. 202. 
71 Ibid., para. 203. 
72 On the capital key “self-imposed limit”, the President of the European Central Bank, Christine 
Lagarde, recently affirmed: “The capital keys provide a general guide to our purchases under PEPP, but it 
does not have to be applied at each and every point in time, so there can be deviation at any point in time 
[…] in order to reach the goals that we assign to the tool we are using.” (from: European Parliament, Commit-
tee on Economic and Monetary Affairs, Monetary Dialogue with Christine Lagarde, President of the Europe-
an Central Bank (pursuant to Art. 284, para. 3, TFEU), 8 June 2020, p. 10, transcript available at 
www.ecb.europa.eu). 
73 Recital no. 5 of the PEPP Decision, cit. 
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c) For what concerns the eligibility requirements, their future relaxation either by 
granting additional ad hoc waivers like in the case of Greece or by their amendment will 
drive the PEPP on the verge of monetary financing. In fact, the BverfG warned that “Any 
further lowering of the criteria below a rating complying with at least Credit Quality Step 
3 would – as was confirmed in the oral hearing – no longer meet the aforementioned 
standards in terms of credit quality assessment”.74 
The message to the ECB from Karlsruhe could not be clearer: achtung, you are test-
ing the limits of our patience!  
This blunt message is even more worrisome considering that the Court of Justice 
had already found the PSPP programme to be consistent with EU law in its Weiss deci-
sion, a decision that is the only one by which the ECB has to abide and that is binding on 
all national courts. 
If a new constitutional complaint on the PEPP is brought before the BVerfG – some-
thing that is very likely in the near future – the clash between the two courts will be fur-
ther exacerbated.  
While the restrictions placed by the Court of Justice on the design of asset purchase 
programmes are flexible enough not to curtail the ECB’s room for manoeuvre, the BVerfG’s 
strict interpretation of the monetary policy mandate and of the monetary financing prohi-
bition would hamper the ECB’s ability to do “whatever it takes” in the event of a crisis. 
The resulting legal uncertainty and erosion of the ECB’s credibility will have lasting 
and negative repercussions on the euro area.  
To preserve the integrity of the EU’s legal order, tensions between the two courts 
have to be solved. Many have already advocated for an infringement procedure against 
Germany.75 
On the main point of contention, however, Art. 125, para. 2, of the TFEU may pro-
vide a solution: on a proposal from the European Commission and after consulting the 
European Parliament, the Council can in fact specify definitions for the application of 
Arts 123 to 125 TFEU.76 
Maybe the time is ripe – even from a political point of view – for revising the 1993 
Regulation that provides various definitions and exemptions from the monetary financ-
 
74 BVerfG, PSPP judgment, cit., para. 208. 
75 See, among others, D. SARMIENTO, J.H.H. WEILER, After Weiss: Proposing A New Mixed Chamber of the 
Court of Justice, in Verfassungsblog, 2 June 2020, verfassungsblog.de. The Authors also propose the crea-
tion of a new appeal jurisdiction within the Court of Justice having a mixed composition (six judges of the 
Court of Justice and six judges from thee Constitutional or Highest Courts of Member States) which would 
only rule on the distribution of competences between the EU and its Member States. 
76 Art. 125, para. 2, TFEU empowers the Council to adopt definitions for the application of the mone-
tary financing prohibition (Art. 123 TFEU), of the prohibition of privileged access to financial institutions 
(Art. 124 TFEU) and of the so-called “no bail-out clause” (Art. 125 TFEU).  
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ing prohibition.77 This instrument may be used to clarify the purpose of Art. 123 TFEU 
and to allow for more flexibility in exceptional circumstances, provided that the mini-
mum requirements identified by the Court of Justice are met. 
IV. Conclusions 
As pointed out by Mario Draghi, the current crisis is caused by an unprecedented eco-
nomic shock that does not originate from reckless behaviour. It requires exceptional 
measures and an expansionary fiscal policy which will inevitably lead to a significant in-
crease of public debt.78 
In this context, and in the absence of a common fiscal policy, the ECB is called to 
play a subsidiary role, with its purchase programmes becoming critical to keep debt 
servicing costs under control. 
The BVerfG judgment, however, is putting sand in the wheels of the ECB and is ex-
posing the limits of the current legal framework, with the ECB called to justify its activi-
ties under its narrow price stability mandate and to demonstrate that the effects of its 
interventions on the general economy are merely “secondary”.79 
Most probably, the BVerfG will interpret the PEPP as a measure that diverts certain 
countries from pursuing a sound fiscal policy, in breach of Art. 123 TFEU. 
The key question – on which the BVerfG and the Court of Justice may provide oppo-
site answers – will be: what does “sound fiscal policy” mean in times of recession, when 
government spending is desperately needed to boost aggregate demand and even the 
EU Stability and Growth Pact has been relaxed activating the general escape clause?80 
The context is quickly changing and to conclude on a more positive note it is worth 
underlining that, despite the BVerfG’s controversial ruling, the German government is 
 
77 See Council Regulation (EC) 3603/93 of 13 December 1993 specifying definitions for the application 
of the prohibitions referred to in Arts 104 and 104b(1) of the Treaty on European Union [1992] (now Arts. 
123 and 125 TFEU). See also Council Regulation (EC) 3604/93 of 13 December 1993 specifying definitions 
for the application of the prohibition of privileged access referred to in Article 104a of the Treaty on Eu-
ropean Union [1992] (now Art. 124 TFEU). 
78 M. DRAGHI, We Face a War Against Coronavirus and Must Mobilise Accordingly, in Financial Times, 25 
March 2020. 
79 See also P. DE SENA, S. D’ACUNTO, La Corte di Karlsruhe, il mito della ‘neutralità’ della politica monetaria 
e i nodi del processo di integrazione europea, in SIDIBlog, 14 May 2020, www.sidiblog.org. 
80 On 23 March 2020, on the basis of a European Commission’s proposal, the European Council en-
dorsed the activation of the so-called “general escape clause” of the Stability and Growth Pact (as set out 
by Arts 5, para. 1, 6, para. 3, 9, para. 1, and 10, para. 3, Regulation (EC) 1466/97, and Arts 3, para. 5, and 5, 
para. 2, Regulation (EC) 1467/97), which allows temporary deviations from the medium-term budgetary 
objective and the appropriate adjustment path towards it in a situation of severe economic downturn of 
the euro area or of the EU as a whole. See, in particular, Communication COM (2020) 123 final of 23 
March 2020 from the European Commission on the activation of the general escape clause of the Stability 
and Growth Pact. 
The PSPP Judgment of the German Federal Constitutional Court 15 
changing its political stance on burden sharing and common European bonds, thus con-
tributing to a leap forward in the European integration process. 
On 18 May 2020, the German Chancellor Angela Merkel and the French President 
Emmanuel Macron presented their joint EU Recovery Initiative.81 
Soon afterwards, the European Commission put forward a comprehensive set of 
proposals for a major recovery plan based on two pillars: on the one side, the 2021-
2027 Multiannual Financial Framework and the Own Resources Decision and, on the 
other side, the Next Generation EU recovery plan, which consists of several facilities 
among which, most importantly, the Recovery and Resilience Facility.82 Overall, to sup-
port economic recovery from the COVID-19 crisis, the EU will mobilise €750 billion, of 
which €500 in grants and the rest in loans. 
Together with the €1350 billion bazooka the ECB is deploying through the PEPP, the 
EU recovery plan will hopefully be enough to avoid a painful and protracted recession, 
but it will have to be accompanied by deep reforms in the direction of further integra-
tion and solidarity. 
 
81 See the initiative France et Allemagne unies pour une relance européenne, 18 May 2020, available at 
www.elysee.fr. 
82 The package of proposals set forth by the European Commission is available at ec.europa.eu and 
at ec.europa.eu. For a first comment, see F. COSTAMAGNA, M. GOLDMANN, Constitutional Innovation, Demo-
cratic Stagnation? The EU Recovery Plan, in Verfassungsblog, 30 May 2020, verfassungsblog.de. 
